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Common experiences and a common past offer a special possibility for good relations.
But having a common past also can create disharmony. If one has to share traditions
with others, it becomes more difficult to find specific elements to call one’s ‘own’. So
especially in a situation of intensive search for identity a common past may be
harmful to the formation of one’s own identity and to mutual relations as well. In the
case of Belarus, Lithuania and Poland after 1989, both generalisations hold true.
While Polish-Lithuanian relations are excellent, Lithuanian-Belarusian relations are
rather complicated. The reasons for this are not only political or economic, but mainly
a consequence of the important role history and historiography play in the process of
collective identity formation. The present article will examine the structure of this
process.
History as a means of legitimation of nation-states
After 1989, not only Soviet satellite states, up until then bound to the Soviet Union by
the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, acquired real independence, but also former Soviet
republics recreated themselves as independent states. One of the main tasks of these
new political units was the formation of collective identities which would confirm
their existence.
2 This was done by means of history. All new states claimed
themselves as old ones, having been victims of an alien system of repression that they
had now got rid of.
It is important to stress this because it shows that not only democratic decisions such
as parliamentary resolutions, free elections and so on legitimated the new
independence. In order to avoid being labelled a nation ‘without history’, the new
states turned to the past for justification and legitimation.
3 They searched for
structures of continuity as grounds for the necessity to recreate their state. By seeking
continuity in the past, this kind of justification was the general method of legitimation
by ‘history’ after 1989. Thus, the longer continuities could be drawn back into the
past, the more precious they appeared for the purposes of contemporary identity
construction. Thus, facts of the remote past, in particular, acquired high importance in
this process of legitimation. Especially important is the detection of medieval states,
1 In this paper I present a research project on ‘Collective identities and history in post-socialist
discourses: Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine’ under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Zdzisław
Krasnodębski at Bremen University, a project which I started in February 2003.
2 For the complexity of collective identity see Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, ‘The
Construction of Collective Identity’, European Journal of Sociology, 36, 1995: 72-102. For identity
politics in the three countries see Graham Smith and others ed. Nation-building in the Soviet
Borderlands. The Politics of National identities, Cambridge 1998: esp. the chapters ‘National history and
national identity in Ukraine and Belarus’, 23-47 and ‘Nation-rebuilding and political discourses of
identity politics in the Baltic states’: 93-118.
3 This was especially important for ‘small nations’ as, for instance, the Belarusians. Despite the
extreme disharmony between Belarusian historians over Belarusian history it was one of the main aims
of all sides to reject the accusation of being a nation without history.64
kingdoms or duchies as ‘predecessor states’, even if this involves resorting to
anachronisms.
4 The reason for the use especially of remote historical facts and not
those of the nearer past in this process of nation-building can to a certain extent be
explained in terms of how collective historical memory works. There is a fundamental
difference between personal historical memory, on the one hand, and cultural
historical memory, on the other.
5 Events in the near past, which form part of personal
memory, such as the Second World War or the political changes after 1989, are part
of controversial discussions. So their role for legitimation is weaker than the role of
events of the medieval past, which are regarded as an integrative part of national
consciousness, widely accepted as an integral part of culture and often even taught in
schools. This is the reason why the present paper will concentrate primarily on an
examination of facts of the remote, rather than the near, past.
Homogeneous nation-states, common history, different interpretations
In the whole of Eastern Europe after 1989, the new states understood themselves as
independent, self-reliant units – not only independent from the Soviet Union, but also
from each other. The idea of one’s own history was one of the consequences of this
social consciousness. The classical form of nationalist ideology is a monistic
construction: one state consists of one nation, of one ethnic unit, has one capital, one
history and so on. This entails the postulate of an exclusive conception of history
having the purpose of legitimating the existing nation-state by giving a rather
teleological narrative of the state’s ethnic unity.
But in the case of the three countries Belarus, Lithuania and Poland the situation is
particular. Here, only Hitler and Stalin had created homogeneous nation-states by
resettlement and relocation of the population and exterminating Jews and minorities.
Before, there had always been multiethnic political units in the area. So after 1989 the
realisation of an exclusive conception of history in these states was loaded with great
conflict potential because of the cultural intersections and the common past of these
countries. All three countries are situated on the territory of the former Republic of
Both Nations. Since this was no modern national state, it is not possible to describe it
as ‘Polish’, ‘Lithuanian’, ‘Belarusian’ or ‘Ukrainian’ without falling into
anachronisms. But the idea of the homogeneous nation state postulated exactly this:
seeking national continuities in the pre-modern period. The result was open
contradiction between historians of the three countries, especially in the eastern part
of the Republic of Both Nations, the so-called Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
These open contradictions are visible in the existence of various different,
conflicting and incompatible narratives developing in Belarus, Lithuania and Poland,
each of them using the Grand Duchy as a source of legitimation for the existing state.
In all of them its capital, Vilnius, plays a fundamental and controversial role. The
Grand Duchy was claimed as being Polish, since (at least after 1569) it was part of the
Republic of Both Nations, often simply called Polish Republic (Rzeczpospolita
Polska). It was also claimed as Lithuanian and viewed as the predecessor state of
4 Jerzy Kłoczowski and others have recently pointed out that one should not speak of the Republic of
Both Nations simply as ‘Poland’, suggesting an anachronistic continuity. See Paweł Wroński, ‘O Unii
Lubelskiej I Unii Europejskiej. Z profesorem Jerzym Kłoczowskim rozmawia Paweł Wroński’,
Magazyn Gazety Wyborczej, 29–30 maja 1988, 22, 273: 9.
5 On the distinction between personal and cultural memory see Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert,
Geschichtsvergessenheit / Geschichtsversessenheit. Vom Umgang mit der deutschen Vergangenheit
nach 1945, Stuttgart 1999: 35-53.65
modern Lithuania.
6 It was finally claimed as Belarusian because of the eastern
Slavonic majority of inhabitants.
7 It is even possible to claim it as the Ukrainian state
(before the union of 1569) or to call the Eastern part of the Kingdom of Poland simply
Ukraine after 1569, even when this interpretation does not play a significant role in
the discussion of Ukraine nowadays. However, for Ukraine the disputes with Russia
on the ‘rights’ on the Kievan Rus’ are far more important than disputes with her
Western neighbours.
8
These different narratives focus on the role of Vilnius. In the Polish narrative, the
town called Wilno forms an integrative part of Polish culture as a centre of Polish
nineteenth century Romanticism with a poet like Adam Mickiewicz at the forefront.
Called Vilnius, the town played the central role in Lithuanian historical and political
thought as ‘capital of Lithuania’, on the basis of the historical argument that the town
was founded by the Lithuanian Duke Gediminas. Belarusians view the same town,
now called Vil’nja, as one of the centres of the Belarusian national movement.
9
The idea of historical ‘truth’ as an obstacle for mutual understanding
Bearing in mind the great potential for conflict that emanates from this one single
example of their common past, it seems to be almost impossible that the three
countries could ever come to terms with each other. Indeed, there were harsh
controversies concerning this especially between certain Lithuanian and Belarusian
historians. A typical Lithuanian comment on Belarusian historical ideas is the
statement ‘One cannot choose one’s history’ (Istorijos nepasirinksi), whereas the
Belarusian ‘answer’ is a similar, almost equal phrase: ‘History is not bound to
elections’ (Historyja ne padliagajuc’ halasavanniam).
10 Deeply rooted in the cultural
memory of every nation lies the idea, or rather feeling, of one single historical
‘reality’ and one real existing past, which historians only have to ‘find out’ and to
6 Alfredas Bumblauskas, ‘Kolizje historiograficzne w kwestii charakterystiki Wiekliego Księstwa
Litewskiego’, Lithuania, Warszawa 1,14, 1995: 29-46. Between Polish and Lithuanian historians there
were violent quarrels over the interpretation of the Latin words ‘applicare’ in the 1385 treaty of Krewo.
Polish historians understood this as incorporation of Lithuania, by this denying Lithuanian
independence as a whole, whereas their Lithuanian colleagues stressed the independence of the Grand
Duchy not only after 1385, but also after 1569. Even nowadays the opinions between Polish historians
are divided, but the incorporation theory has lost its leading role in Polish historical thinking. For a
short overview of the historiography of Polish-Lithuanian union see Mečislovas Jučas, Lenkijos ir
Lietuvos unija (XIV a. vid. – XIX a. pr.), Vilnius 2000: 11-85.
7 Jakub Zejmis, ‘Belarusian National Historiography and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a Belarusian
state’, Zeitschrift für Ost- und Ostmitteleuropaforschung, 48, 3, 1999: 383-96.
8 A good overview of Ukrainian historiography is offered by Tomasz Stryjek, ‘Historiografia a konflikt
o Kresy Wschodnie w latach 1939 - 1953. Radzieckie, rosyjskie, ukraińskie i polskie prezentacje
dziejów ziem wschodnich dawnej Rzeczpospolitej jako część ‘wojny ideologicznej’ w okresie lat
trzydziestych – pięćdziesiątych XX wieku’, in Krzysztof Jasienica ed. Tygiel narodów. Stosunki
społeczne i etniczne na dawnych ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej 1939 – 1953, Warszawa 2002:.
429-564. See also Stephen Velychenko, Shaping identity in Eastern Europe and Russia. Soviet-Russian
and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History 1914 – 1991, New York 1993.
9 Andrzej Garlicki, ‘Wilno żądają wszyscy’, in Robert Traba ed. Tematy polsko-litewskie. Historia.
Literatura. Edukacja, Olsztyn 1999: 67-83.
10 Albinas Kuncevičius, ‘Istorijos nepasirinksi. Baltarusijos vėlyvųjų viduramžių archeologijos
naujienos 1993 metų publikacijose’, Baltų archeologija 8, 2 ,1994: 23-24 and Anatol’ Citoŭ, ‘Lios
simvala – lios naroda’, in Ė. M. Skobelev ed. Gerb i flag belorusskoj derzhavy, Minsk 1997: 10. In his
own words, the Lithuanian historian intended to reject Belarusian aspirations to the Lithuanian past,
whereas his Belarusian colleague in these very words intended to defend the Belarusian character of
these very facts against other positions.66
‘demonstrate’.
11 Processes of commemoration aim at strengthening these feelings in a
ritualised manner in the form of holidays, commemoration days, monuments and so
on.
12 A nationalist, teleological interpretation of this feeling is the notion of historical
‘rights’ or historical ‘missions’ a nation must fulfil.
It is these very ideas of historical ‘truth’, historical ‘missions’ and historical ‘rights’
that make understanding so difficult. The idea of historical ‘truth’ augmented
dramatically in the last years of the socialist system. Oppositional movements stressed
the idea of the one and unique historical ‘truth’ making a sharp distinction between
communist ‘lies’ and their own historical ‘truth’.
13 This led to an enforced history
within society, totally obscuring the fact that no change from ‘lie’ to ‘truth had taken
place’, but only a change from one system of interpretation to another. The
historiography of the anti-communist opposition, too, was, however, guided by
interests.
14
But already a few years after the end of the communist system, the simple distinction
between ‘lies’ and ‘truth’ became increasingly obsolete. Under the Soviet regime, one
single, unified narrative of history in the form of a canon, serving as state ideology
had dominated, even if (as, for instance, in Poland) already at the end of the ‘70s this
domination came to be questioned. After 1989, a quick diversification took place. The
result was a pluralism of cultures of memory and the development of different and
contradictory lieux de mémoire, leading to a landscape of conflicting memories. For
example, the forced common consensus on Soviet foundation myths (e.g. victory in
Second World War) no longer existed. The Jedwabne discussion in Poland destroyed
old common myths and helped to start a contrastive, pluralistic discussion on the
past.
15
Consequently, pluralism in society gave rise to pluralism of conceptions of history
and narratives. Thus, after 1989, it is not possible to speak simply of ‘the Polish
narrative’, for instance. The best example is Belarus, where at least two contrastive
conceptions of history developed in opposition to each other, each of them trying to
11 See Henryk Samsonowicz, O ‘historii prawdziwej’. Mity, legendy i podania jako źródło historyczne,
Gdańsk 1997 esp. the chapter ‘Co to jest mit?’: 6-26. For a methodological approach to the problem of
‘truth’ see Chris Lorenz, Konstruktion der Vergangenheit. Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie,
Köln 1997 especially the chapter ‘Tatsache, Interpretation und Wahrheit’: 35-64.
12 A good overview on the situation of various European countries is to be found in Emil Brex and
Hannes Stekl, Der Kampf um das Gedächtnis, Wien 1997. See for the Polish case the articles of
Stanisław Grodziski, ‘Nationalfeiertage und öffentliche Gedenktage Polens im 19. und 20.
Jahrhundert’: 205-16 and Czesław Brzoza, ‘Aus der Geschichte des 3. Mai-Gedenktages in Polen’:
217-30.
13 This was especially stressed in the Soviet Union opposite groups. See e.g. Robert W. Davies, Soviet
History in the Gorbachev Revolution, London 1989 and Gert Meyer ed. Wir brauchen die Wahrheit.
Geschichtsdiskussion in der Sowjetunion, 2
nd edn, Köln 1989.
14 This is not to deny the necessity of detecting socialist ‘foundation lies’ as Kurapaty or others of
moral importance. See e.g. David R. Marples, ‘Kuropaty. The Investigation of Stalinist Historical
Controversy’, Slavic Review, 53, 1994: 513-23.
15 See Paweł Machcewicz, ‚Przeszłość jako wyzwanie’ in Paweł Machcewicz and others ed. Wokół
Jedwabnego, 2 vols, Warszawa 2002, 1, 14-7. On the diversification of memory cultures in Lithuania
see Alfredas Bumblauskas and others ed. Lietuvos sovietinė istoriografia. Teoriniai ir ideologiniai
kontekstai, Vilnius 2001; Rüdiger Ritter, ‘Prescribed identity. The Role of History for the Legitimation
of Soviet Rule in Lithuania’, in Olaf Mertelsmann ed. The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 1940 – 1956,
Tartu 2003: 85-11; in Belarus Rainer Lindner, Historiker und Herrschaft. Nationsbildung und
Geschichtspolitik in Weißrußland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, München 1999, chapter ‘Nationsbildung
und Geschichtspolitik in spät- und postsowjetischer Zeit’, 367-478.67
claim historical ‘truth’ for itself.
16 Thus, the situation after the end of the Socialist
system grew even more complicated. In the new countries, various different and
contradictory narratives evolved, replacing the forced agreement of an official
Socialist/Soviet narrative.
Different types of understanding the nation
The challenge was thus the same for all three countries. In order to come to terms with
each other, their individual ‘truth’ had to be modified in a certain way. But the ability
to do so was not equal in all these countries. As the following analysis will show, the
ability depends on the ruling idea of nation and of the structure of national narratives
in each of the given countries. There are great differences in both points between the
three countries: firstly, there is a different type of understanding of ‘nation’ between
Poland, Lithuania and Belarus and, secondly, there is a characteristic structure of
intersection of Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian foundation myths.
The idea of nation forms the centre of the historical narratives of all three countries.
But what is meant by nation in these countries is far from being the same.
Additionally, there is a pluralism of concepts of nation in each one of these countries.
In Polish thinking two main streams exist: there is the ethnical, ‘modern’ concept and
the historical, ‘federalistic’ one, both symbolised by Roman Dmowskis idea of Piast’s
Poland and, on the other side, Józef Piłsudski’s idea of a Jagiellonian Poland.
17
Poland’s Western shift after 1945 led to a concentration on an ethnic-based
understanding of nation, but the idea of a Polish historical, cultural nation still exists
to this day.
The Lithuanian idea of nation seems to be purely ethnical at the first glance.
18 But
there is an historical element in the Lithuanian concept of nation also, which is visible
in the claim for Vilnius at the beginning of nineteenth century. The Lithuanian claim
rested in fact on historical reasons, being justified by the character of Vilnius as the
capital of medieval ‘Lithuania’. But even this claim for Vilnius is based on what one
could call a historical ethnic idea of the Lithuanian nation: there is the Lithuanian
conception of an ethnic Lithuanian medieval state with a then Lithuanian-inhabited
capital of Vilnius, which lost its Lithuanian character only because of processes of
polonisation and belorussification.
19 So, finally, the claim for Vilnius is based on an
ethnic idea of nation, too. In fact, there is no real historical idea of nation in
Lithuanian thinking today: The modern Lithuanian national movement did (and does)
not claim the whole territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania as the future
Lithuanian state, but only its small Western part, the so-called ‘Lithuania propria’.
16 Anna Brzozowska, ‘Symbols, Myths, and Metaphors. The Discursive Battle over the ‘True’
Belarusian Narrative’, Slovo, 15, 1, 2003: 49-58; Henadz Sahanovich, ‘The War against Belarusian
history’, Education in Russia, the Independent States and Eastern Europe, 20, 1, 2002: 18-27.
17 See the essay of Andrzej Walicki, Trzy patriotyzmy. Trzy tradycje polskiego patriotyzmu i ich
znaczenie współczesne, Warszawa 1991.
18 For Lithuanian idea of nation see Abba S. Stražas, ‘From Auszra to the Great War: The Emergence
of the Lithuanian nation’, Lituanus 42, 4, 1996: 34-73. Old, but useful is Manfred Hellmann, ‘Die
litauische Nationalbewegung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’, Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, 2, 1953: 66-
106. See also V. Stanley Vardys and Judith Sedaitis, Lithuania. The Rebel Nation, Boulder 1997
chapter ‘At the European crossroads: Lithuania’s Historical roots’, 1-27.
19 Across the centuries the Lithuanian language almost disappeared because there was no written
tradition, but the consciousness of being ‘Lithuanian’ remained, even if it was expressed in Polish. See
Zigmas Zinkevičius, The History of the Lithuanian Language, Vilnius 1998: 263.68
The Belarusian understanding of nation contains important ethnic elements, too.
20
The idea of an old Belarusian nation with its own language helped consolidate the
idea of an independent Belarusian (and Belarusian-speaking) intelligentsia between
both Poland and Russia. The ‘Lithuanian statutes’ of sixteenth century written in a
language considered as predecessor of Belarusian are held as evidence of this. The
idea behind it is that three eastern Slav tribes (Krivichy, Dregovichy, Radimichy)
represent the starting point of Belarusian ethnogenesis. But there are also many
arguments regarding the existence of a non-ethnical concept of nation based on the
idea of a Belarusian territory.
21 This is especially to be seen in the field of culture,
which promotes the notion of a ‘whole-Belarusian process’ dating back to the Middle
Ages, which includes ethnic non-Belarusian people.
22 This idea allows the integration
of noblemen in Belarusian history, ordinarily simply known as ‘Polish’ or
‘Lithuanian’ such as Radziwiłł or Ogiński.
23 Underlying this seems to be the concept
of a Belarusian territory, seen as constant ever since the Middle Ages.
24 Significant
for this ‘territorial’ thinking is the outstanding position of the borderlines of the
Belarusian state in the coat of arms from 1995.
Summing up briefly, it is worth noting that in all three countries there is an ethnic
idea of nation in connection with others, among which the historical idea of nation
seems to be of special importance. Since the general development after 1989 not only
in the three countries, but in the whole of Eastern Europe, went in the direction of
ethnically-based nation states, it seems obvious that Poland and then Lithuania with
their mainly ethnically-based conception of nation had better possibilities for their
nation-building than Belarus with its different conception based also on territorial
arguments. The specific problem of the Belarusian case is already visible at this point:
the intention to draw their ‘own’ narrative by exploring non-ethnical Belarusian
elements leads to an ‘exclusion by inclusion’. Claiming all events on the territory of
today’s Belarus as ‘its own’ is hardly tolerable for neighbours having mostly ethnic-
based ideas of nation.
25
Intersection of foundation myths decides the structure of the narrative
The second difference between the three countries’ historical position lies in the
structure of possible national narratives. An analysis of national narratives of history
demonstrates their construction as a sort of chain of foundation myths,
26 which in
20 See for the following Lindner, Historiker, chapter ‘Nationales Selbstverständnis und ‘weißrussische
Mission’’: 459-67.
21 As Timothy Snyder puts it, Belarusians formed the biggest ethnic unit, but nevertheless formed no
nation. See Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus,
1569 – 1999, New Haven, 2003: 281
22 This idea is stressed not only in political discourse, but also in the field of culture. In the introduction
to his history of Belarusian music, V. Skorabagataŭ speaks of an ‘all-Belarusian process’, thus showing
a non-ethnic-based idea of Belarusianness. See Viktar Skorabagataŭ, Zaigrali spadchynnyia kuranty.
Cykl narysaŭ z historyi prafesiinai muzychnai kultury Belarusi, Minsk, 1998: 13.
23 For a Belarusian interpretation of the Radziwiłł family see Irina Maslenicyna and Nikolaj
Bogodziazh, Radzivilly – Nesvizhskie koroli (istoricheskie miniatiury), Minsk 1997.
24 In the work of Georgii Vasil’evich Shtychaŭ, Starazhytnyja dzjarzhavy na terytoryi Belarusi, 2
nd edn,
Minsk, 2002, the title already suggests the existence of Belarus in ancient times.
25 One can see here at work elements of a premodern understanding of nation, as Timothy Snyder puts
it: Snyder, Reconstruction: 281.
26 A ‘foundation myth’ in the sense used here means a fact or event of the past playing a decisive role
in the formation of a certain narrative, thus being a crucial stone in the building of collective identity.
In this way a ‘narrative’ can be understood as a composition of the basic foundation myths. See69
their sum explain the character of the now existing nation. It seems obvious that there
are two basic kinds of foundation myths. Myths of the first kind serve as legitimation
only for one single nation, those of the second kind can be used by various nations.
In the national narratives of the three countries, there are foundation myths of both
groups. One example for the first kind is the kingdom of the Polish Piast dynasty - a
Polish central foundation myth, but without significance for her eastern neighbours, so
there are no disputes at all about this subject.
27 One example of the second kind is the
Republic of Both Nations, especially its eastern part, the Grand Duchy, forming an
important foundation myth for Lithuanians and Belarusians as well, additionally being
an important element of Polish and Ukrainian narratives of history. These one could
call ‘intersected myths’ because of their multifunctional character, important for
identity constructions of two or more nations.
28
Such ‘intersected’ myths make possible a classification of narratives into two: those
with a high percentage of ‘undisputed’ foundation myths (i.e. having a function for
one single nation only), and those with a higher number of ‘intersected’ myths. This
classification is important, because the structure of the narrative essentially
determines the problems encountered by one nation in forming her identity by
constructing a concise and consistent story of its own historical development. The a
priori existence of many intersected foundation myths in a given narrative
complicates the process of self-definition and forces one to justify one’s use of
historical events to the neighbours.
So the quota of intersected foundation myths in the narrative of one nation
determines the possibilities of writing a ‘purely individual’ history, a history of one’s
own, without getting into conflict with one’s neighbours. The more ‘intersected’
foundation myths occur, the more problems occur as a consequence of constructing an
‘exclusive’ narrative. If a nation can dispose of many individual, undisputed
foundation myths, the construction of a narrative and thus of national collective
identity is much easier. Moreover, there is a connection between concise narrative and
identity: the more individual foundation myths exist, the stronger one’s own identity
construction.
The ‘intersection area’: Geography and the structures of narratives
In most cases, foundation myths are linked up with concrete issues, that is, with
historical figures, historical events or historical landscapes. It is interesting that very
often foundation myths are bound to a certain territory. Looking at where the three
countries get their foundation myths from nowadays, there is a distinction between
‘individual’ areas and ‘intersected’ ones (e.g. for the Polish case the difference
between the towns of Kraków and Wilno). There is a certain ‘intersection area’, which
Samsonowicz, O ‘historii prawdziwej’, chapters ‘Mity ‘Początku’’ and ‘Polskie mity Początku’: 27-40
and 59-70.
27 See Marek Cetwiński, ‘Kazimierz Odnowiciel: Mit wiecznego powrotu w dziejopisarstwie polskim’,
Biuletyn Instytut Filozoficzny – Historyczny WSP w Częstochowie, 17, 6, 1999: 3-7; Jerzy Topolski,
‘Historiographische Mythen. Eine methodologische Einführung’ in Adelheid von Saldern ed. Mythen
in Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung aus polnischer und deutscher Sicht, Münster 1996: 27-35.
28 There are also examples of historical events which are interpreted in a different manner by
neighbours, but which do not play a central role in their historical consciousness. One example is the
Chmielnicki-uprising of 1648 – a Ukrainian foundation myth, but interpreted on the Polish side only as
riot without further importance for the formation of Polish identity. See Paul Robert Magocsi, A
History of Ukraine, Seattle 1995: chapter ‘The Polish Historical Viewpoint’, esp. 17 and ‘The
Ukrainian Historical Viewpoint’, esp. 19.70
one could locate approximately between Vilnius and Minsk, to which the foundation
myths of all three countries are bound.
To understand Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian problems of history and of mutual
relations in the right way, it is important to consider the character of the region
between Vilnius and Minsk. It is one of the typical East European border regions,
where various national narratives and interests stand in sharp contrast between each
other and can hardly be solved because of the very complicated ethnic structure at the
micro-level. The number of these border regions in Eastern Europe is mainly due to
the ethnic mix in many parts of Eastern Europe. But the specific nature of the region
between Vilnius and Minsk has to do with the fact that there are neither ‘natural
borders’ in this region nor a historical name.
29
Unlike other border regions like Galicia, Bukowina or Transylvania, the region
between Vilnius and Minsk never formed an independent political unit, but
nevertheless has got a specific quality. It is the region where, since medieval times,
East Slav and Baltic tribes lived together. In the Middle Ages, the area of Baltic
settlement reached at least as far as Minsk, so it is not enough to speak only of the
Vilnius region as an intersection area.
30 The Polish element, which was present in the
region since late Middle Ages, led to the notion of North-Western kresy - the only
kind of denomination existing for this territory. But there are two problems with this
name: firstly, it is a Polish notion only and evokes the idea of Polish domination in
this area: kresy means borderlands, so people living in this area are mentally mapped
to be at the eastern borders of a centre being Poland. For obvious reasons, this
conception is not acceptable neither for Lithuanians, nor for Belarusians nor
Ukrainians. Secondly, the notion of kresy does not distinguish between areas with
ethnic Lithuanian, Belarusian or Ukrainian population, thus postulating a uniformity,
which in fact did not exist.
31
The present-day states of Belarus, Lithuania and Poland share this area, but it is
important to point out in what sense. Following its Western shift, present-day Poland
contains hardly any part of what one could call the ‘intersection area’. But also in
former times, there was a Polish state with a considerably extensive area called
‘Polish’: the Polish Kingdom that endured up to 1795 as the Western part of the
Republic of Both Nations. This meant that the heritage of the past one can rely on to
form a ‘Polish’ historical narrative contains a considerable number of ‘undisputed’
foundation myths, historical events as well as towns or regions such as Kraków, the
regions Wielkopolska and Małopolska and others. So especially in Poland it is
possible to build a historical narrative without using the intersected Eastern myths and
based on an huge number of foundation myths undoubtedly ‘Polish’ dating back to the
Middle Ages such as the Piast dynasty or King Kazimierz Wielki. This ‘ethnic’ Polish
history can serve as social glue, moderating identity losses concerning the Eastern
29 See Ralph Schattkowsky, ‘Das Land zwischen Ost und West. Regionalität und Herrschaft im
östlichen Mitteleuropa’, in Mieczysław Wojciechowski and Ralph Schattkowsky (ed.), Historische
Grenzlandschaften Ostmitteleuropas im 16. und 20. Jh. Gesellschaft – Wirtschaft – Politik, Toruń
1996: 7-24; Stefan Troebst, ‘What’s in a Historical Region? A Teutonic Perspective’, European Review
of History, 10, 2003: 173-88.
30 See Zigmas Zinkevičius, ‘Pietryčių Lietuva nuo seniausių laikų iki mūsų dienų’ and Valerijus
Čekmonas and Laima Grumadienė, ‘Kalbų paplitimas rytų Lietuvoje’, both in K. Garšva and Laima
Grumadienė (ed.), Lietuvos rytai. Straipsnių rinkinys, Vilnius 1993: 42-100 and 132-6.
31 On the term kresy see Hanna Dylągowa, ‘Kresy – pojęcie historyczne i emocjonalne’, Więż, 9, 1999:
95-101 and Stefan Kieniewicz, ‘Kresy. Przemiany terminologiczne w perspektywie dziejowej’,
Przegląd Wschodni, 1, 1, 1991: 3-13.71
region.
32 What causes problems in the Polish narrative is the idea of former Polish
Eastern cultural domination.
Nowadays Lithuania contains Vilnius and the Vilnius region: an important part of
the mentioned ‘intersection area’. So the problem of intersected foundation myths is
much more important and it is not possible for Lithuanian historians to create an
undisputed ‘Lithuanian character’ of this region. But Lithuania like Poland consists
additionally of a region with undisputed ‘Lithuanian’ character: the region of
Samogitia, which had constituted during several times in history a nucleus of
Lithuanian national self-assertion. This fact has recently led to a strong regionalistic
Samogitian self-awareness and a conception of history predicated on the assumption
of being the ‘real’ Lithuania.
33
Belarus is in the most unfavourable position, being wholly situated in the mentioned
‘intersection area’. There is no Belarusian region fulfilling a similar role as the
Kingdom of Poland or Samogitia.
34 Between Lithuania and Belarus, there is a second
point, making the situation of Belarus even more unfavourable. Given the similarity
of the Belarusian language to both Polish and Russian, Belarusian culture did not have
an equally undisputed criterion for self-definition and segregation as had the
Lithuanians with their non-Slavic and therefore very different language.
35 It is
interesting to note that the acceleration of Lithuanian national movement started with
the public use of the Lithuanian language. To this day the Lithuanian language has
had a high mythical value in Lithuanian culture.
36 One can detect here a reason for, on
the one hand, the fast success of the Lithuanian national movement and, on the other,
the weakness of the Belarusian case. The Belarusian language was treated either as a
Polish or as a Russian dialect and thus could not fulfil a similar function. So the
postulate of a Belarusian distinct identity was not believed a priori by its neighbours,
but had to be demonstrated again and again.
32 Wojciech Wrzesiński ed. Polskie mity polityczne XIX i XX wieku, 2 vols, Wrocław, 1994 - 1996 gives
an overview over crucial Polish myths. The myth of Polish East (Daniel Beauvois, ‘Mit Kresów
Wschodnich” czyli jak mu położyć kres’, in Wrzesiński, Polskie mity, vol. 1, 93-106) is here only one
myth among others.
33 See e.g. Adomas Butrimas and others, Žemaitijos istorija, Vilnius 1997, esp. the chapter by Egidijus
Aleksandravičius ‘Žemaicių kultūrinis sąjūdis Lietuvos atgimimo istorijoje’: 270-94.
34 However, an important direction in Belarusian historiography uses the medieval duchy of Polack as
undisputed foundation myth. See Lindner, Historiker: 81-4.
35 The problem is not the youth of the Belarusian language, because there is a vivid literal tradition not
only during the reformation, but also in the Middle Ages, when the so-called ‘Old-Belarusian’ was the
official written language of the Grand Duchy. In this function, the Belarusian language is one of the
few non-intersected foundation myths of present-day Belarus. But this myth is relatively weak because
of the similar character of Belarusian in comparison to Polish and Russian. See Snyder, Reconstruction,
41. Many Polish and Russian speakers still do not accept the character of Belarusian as an individual
language, considering it a mere dialect and calling it and its mixed forms ‘the simple language’ (jazyk
‘po prostu’). See Čekmonas, ‘Kalbų paplitimas’: 133. In present-day Belarus there exists a complicated
structure of language mixture of Belarusian and Russian. See Nacional’naja Akademija Nauk Belarusi.
Instytut jazykoznanija imeni Jakuba Kolasa ed. Tipologija dvujazyčija i mnogojazyčija v Belarusi,
Minsk 1999: 112-242.
36 For the Lithuanian idea of nation see Vytautas Berenis, ‘Modernėjančių mentalitetų gimimas’, in
Berenis and others ed. Lietuvių mentalitetai: tautinė istorija ir kultūros problemos, Vilnius 2002: 190-
220. The importance of language for the Lithuanian national idea being characteristic for all Baltic
countries is stressed by Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States. Years of
Dependence, 1940 – 1980, London 1983: 167.72
Strategy
There are two main strategies of coping with the past and writing history. From a
maximalistic, exclusive position, writing history not only serves as a means of self-
definition, but also acquires a strictly exclusive character by creating a history of
‘one’s own’ and ignoring the needs and interpretations of one’s neighbours. The
opposite view offers an inclusive version of historiography, which understands the
idea of historiography as a common task, as the consequence of a common past.
Accepting inclusive elements in one’s own narrative makes for better mutual
understanding, but also presupposes the giving up of several elements of the exclusive
conception. In particular the mentioned idea of historical ‘truth’, common and
widespread in non-scientific circles of society, had to be seriously modified for these
purposes. In the process of designing their identity and their mutual relations, the
main task of the three states after 1989 was to find solutions in this field.
Poland – Lithuania: ‘getting rid’ of history?
In his study, Timothy Snyder shows that after 1989 an important step of Polish
Eastern policy was the rupture with the old traditional Polish understanding of these
areas. The Polish idea of a cultural nation postulated a Polish cultural mission into the
East, which viewed in a certain sense present-day Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine as
part of Poland. The rupture implemented by foreign minister Skubiszewski and
prepared by Jerzy Giedroyć and Jerzy Mierosławski in the Polish emigration journal
Kultura consisted of two main elements. The first was the decision to treat the Eastern
neighbours as states with equal rights and not to see them through the lens of one’s
own narrative. The second element was to place the state interests of the present-day
Polish republic higher above any contentious historical debates.
37
This strategy succeeded in many respects. By ‘leaving history to the historians’ and
preventing its exploitation in actual politics, not only a normalisation of mutual
relations with neighbours was possible, but also a harmonisation of historical
narratives. In the case of Lithuania and Ukraine, this strategy worked well: Poland and
Ukraine succeeded in coming to terms on a most contentious part of their mutual
history, when both countries founded a bilateral commission with the aim of
elucidating the mutual massacres of the 1940s and the post-war resettlement of
Ukrainians by communist Poland, the so-called akcja Wisła.
38
Poland and Lithuania divided between themselves the historical heritage of the
Republic of Both Nations and Grand Duchy: Poland came to regard itself as a
successor of the Western, while Lithuania views itself as successor of the Eastern
part.
39 When the majority of Polish historians spoke no longer of an annexation or
incorporation of ‘Lithuania’ into ‘Poland’ in 1385, they accepted by this the
Lithuanian construction of succession, the Lithuanian historical ‘rights’ on the Grand
37 Snyder, Reconstruction: 218-20. See also Romuald Wernik, O realną politykę wschodnią. Kilka
uwag o polskiej polityce wschodniej i mniejszościowej, Wrocław 1999.
38 After the government formally apologized for this, a common historical commission was set up with
the aim of investigating the akcja Wisła. See Grzegorz Motyka, ‘Problematyka stosunków polsko-
ukraińskich w latach 1939 – 1948 w polskiej historiografii po roku 1989’, in Piotr Kosiewski and
Grzezgorz Motyka ed. Historycy Polscy i ukraińscy wobec problemów XX wieku, Kraków 2000: 166-
78; Włodzimierz Bonusiak ed. Polska i Ukraina w podręcznikach swzkolnych i akademickich.
Materiały z konferencji naukowej nt. podręczników szkolnych i akademickich w Polsce i na Ukrainie,
odbytej 18-19 września 2000 r. w Wyższej Szkole Pedagogicznej w Rzeszowie, Rzeszów 2001.
39 Snyder, Reconstruction, 251.73
Duchy. In addition, both partners created a common version of the Vilnius/Wilno
history, downplaying any remaining controversies.
The reason for these common activities of Poland and Lithuania can be detected in
their common state interests: both states strongly pursued membership in the
European Union. This meant the necessity to solve neighbour and minority problems
as a precondition of entrance. Especially for the Lithuanian raison d’état the notion
was crucial that orientation to the West and membership of Western institutions
(strongly desired because of a fear of Russian aspirations) was possible only with the
help and in communication with the pre-war enemy Poland. As a result, an idea of a
‘strategic partnership’ of the two countries evolved.
40
But there was also a price to be paid for the Polish-Lithuanian agreement. Creating a
common, harmonised version of history automatically means 1) a break with one’s
own traditions and 2) accepting the historical constructions of the other partner.
Poland did the former by giving up her historical ‘rights’ on Vilnius. This meant a
sharp rupture with traditions rooted in Polish cultural thought.
41 Secondly, this also
meant Polish acceptance of Vilnius as the capital of Lithuania and an acceptance of
the Lithuanian construction of history – especially of the two main problems of
Lithuanian history construction.
Firstly, there was a contradiction between the Lithuanian view of the annexation of
Lithuania by the Soviet Union in 1940 as an aggression (which is what it actually
was) and the fact that Stalin himself had given Vilnius to this country. From a logical
point of view, condemning the aggression would also mean condemning the ‘return’
of Vilnius. The reason for the rejection of this contradiction lies in the second
contradiction of Lithuanian history that Poland had to accept: before 1940, Vilnius
was anything but an ethnic Lithuanian city. Even the most optimistic statistics could
count no more than 2% Lithuanians, whereas the Poles came to 30% (the most
numerous ethnic group in the city were the Jews with 40%). What made Vilnius the
ethnically Lithuanian city that it is today was Soviet resettlement politics. If one were
to use the ethnic criterion, Lithuanians should have given Vilnius back to Poland after
the Second World War. But instead of insisting on arguments like this, on the Polish
side efforts were made to accept the Lithuanian positions, for the first time in history
perceiving Lithuania as an equal political partner.
42
Lithuania on the other hand, accepted Polish problems. This shows the ‘new’
Lithuanian reaction to the ‘old’ Polish ideas of cultural mission, which remained
vivid, because they are so deeply rooted in cultural memory, which cannot be blotted
out overnight by political decisions. If Polish official politics accepted the
40 See for the Lithuanian search for security Peter van Ham, ‘The Baltic States and Europe: The Quest
for security’, in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin, The Baltic states in world politics, Richmond 1998:
24-45; for Polish fulfilment of conditions for EU-entrance see Wanda Dugiel, ‘Warunki członkostwa w
Unii Europejskiej i ich spełnianie przez Polskę, in Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska (ed.), Stosunki
Polski z Unią Europejską, Warszawa 2002: 95-116; for ‘strategical partnership’ and Lithuanian-Polish
relations see Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, ‘Trudne partnerstwo strategiczne’ and Povilas Gylys,
‘Najnowsza historia rozwoju stosunków polsko-litewskich’, both in Stanisław Miklaszewski ed. Polska
polityka wschodnia, Kraków 2000: 31-40 and 57-62; Raimundas Lopata, ‘Lietuvos ir Lenkijos
valstybinių santykių raida nuo 1990 m.’, Šiaurės Atėnai, 17. X. 1998, 37, 431.
41 In 1999, the vice-president of the Polish parliament Jan Król expressed the opinion that one should
not overestimate Polish-Lithuanian minority questions, thus showing the intention to set more stock by
Polish-Lithuanian relations as a whole than by ‘old’ minority ‘rights’. See Jan Król, ‘Współpraca
polska-litewska’, in Miklaszewski, Polska polityka, 25-6.
42 Two examples: Janusz Dunin-Horkawicz, ‚Jak szanować Litwę? Nurty wileńskiego myślenia’,
Zeszyty Historyczne, 128, 1999: 82-8; Bogdan Szlachta, ‘Zrozumieć rację Litwinów’, Więż, 8 1992: 22-
31.74
Lithuanianness of Vilnius and its culture, the idea of cultural heritage has endured to
this day.
43 Thus present-day Polish schoolchildren still learn by heart the famous
beginning of Mickiewicz’s poem Pan Tadeusz ‘Lithuania, my fatherland’. For Polish
cultural thinking the idea of a Polish cultural heritage and of a Polishness of Vilnius
and of Mickiewicz is crucial. It is so strongly embedded in the minds of the Polish
population, that its rejection on the basis of rational, state-interest-led reasons is
simply impossible.
With this harmonised version of history, it is possible nowadays for Lithuanians to
accept the Polish position. Since it was no more absolutely necessary to postulate the
Lithuanianness of Vilnius Romantic poets, it was much easier to accept Polish ideas
of Polish cultural heritage on Lithuanian territory. The switch can be seen in the
following two examples. At the beginning of the Lithuanian national movement with
the journal Aušra in 1882, Jonas Basanavičius claimed for the purposes of national
self-definition the whole past of the region as Lithuanian, speaking of Mickiewicz,
Kondratowicz, Moniuszko and all Vilnius Romantics as Lithuanians.
44 Nowadays, not
only the common Polish-Lithuanian background of Mickiewicz is stressed,
45 but also
his ‘European’ character.
46 This shows once more how intensively the leading idea of
Europe structures historical Lithuanian thinking.
47
It was this orientation towards actual state interests that led Lithuanian political
leaders to an acceptance of Polish positions at a further crucial point. Since the
emergence of an independent Lithuania after 1989 the strong postulate of an official
excuse by Poland for the occupation of Vilnius by General Żeligowski in 1920 limited
the possibilities of a Polish-Lithuanian agreement. Thus, the Lithuanians wanted Poles
not only to accept the Lithuanian historical narrative, but also demanded an excuse
from a state which was not responsible for the action.
48 In 1993, Landsbergis for the
first time spoke of the possibility of an agreement with Poland without a Polish
excuse for Żeligowski. This and the final ratification of the Polish-Lithuanian treaty
one year later marked an important turning point. In placing state interests above
historical ‘right’, Lithuania accepted the Polish position and thus desisted from
demanding that Poland should accept the Lithuanian historical narrative as a whole.
49
43 For the idea of Polish culture in the East see Grzegorz Kotlarski and Marek Figura (ed.), Oblicza
wschodu w kulturze polskiej, Poznań 1999.
44 Jerzy Ochmański, Litewski ruch narodowo-kulturalny w XIX wieku (do 1890 r.), Białystok 1965: 179-
90.
45 In his article on the film by Polish director Andrzej Wajda ‘Pan Tadeusz’, based on the poem by
Adam Mickewicz, Marius Ivaškevič called Mickiewicz a ‘bridge’ between Poland and Lithuania. See
Marius Ivaškevič, ‘Kodėl aš ne lenkas? Mintys, šovusios į galvą žiūrint “Poną Tadą”‘, Kultūros barai,
4, 2000: 40.
46 See Egidijus Aleksandravičius (ed.), Mickevičiaus Lietuva. Adomo Mickevičiaus 200-osioms gimimo
metinėms, Kaunas 1999 and Aušra Jurgutienė (ed.), Lietuvos kultūra: romantizmo variantai: mokslinės
konferencijos, skirto Adomo Mickevičiaus 200-osioms gimimo metinėms ir įvykusios 1998 gruodžio
dieną, medžiaga, Vilnius 2001.
47In the years before joining the EU, the problem of the European Character of Lithuanian culture was
broadly discussed. Historians pointed out the individuality of Lithuanian culture in a European context
dating to the Middle Ages. See Darius Staliūnas ed. Europos idėja Lietuvoje: istorija ir dabartis,
Vilnius 2002; Alfredas Bumblauskas and Rimvydas Petrauskas (ed.), Lietuvos europejimo keliais:
istorines studijos, Vilnius 2002; I. Vinogradnaitė, ‘The Construction of National and European Identity
in Lithuania’, in P. Drulák ed. National and European identities in EU enlargement. Views from
Central and Eastern Europe, Praha 2001: 95 – 112.
48 Poland could not accept this postulate as this would lead to further revanchist postulates from other
countries. Snyder, Reconstruction, 254.
49 Ibid., 272 f.75
The Polish-Lithuanian conflict now became part of an old, finished history (therefore
historicised) and was described as such in the Lithuanian media.
50
In this way, Poland and Lithuania managed not only to organise the past by dividing
historical heritage, but also to cope with the ideas of historical ‘truths’ existing in both
societies. This was perhaps the most important achievement of the whole process.
Poland and Lithuania managed to combine the harmonised narratives of history with
the historical ‘feelings’ dominating their respective societies. This was of crucial
importance for the survival of the narrative. If history or a historiographic description
only claims to be a rational construction ‘from above’ and differs too much from these
feelings, it runs the risk of losing social acceptance or even of being labelled as
‘false’. For purposes of identity construction, it becomes worthless because it cannot
play the role of ‘social glue’.
For Polish society, the problem was harder than it was for the Lithuanians. To this
day it has been a delicate task to accept and to marginalise kresy-Romanticism in
Polish society.
51 In contrast to this, Lithuanians are in quite a good position, because
their historical narrative won over. No longer forced to stress the problems of this
narrative, they can use its integrative potential. Here lies an important reason for the
intensity of mobilisation and restructuration of the Lithuanian society. At the official
level, Lithuania nowadays presents itself as a Europe-orientated, modern nation-state
with fair-play politics on minority questions.
52 In this way, the orientation towards
Europe and the European Union helped modify and render more malleable the
historical ‘truth’ in both countries and offered an Ersatz and an additional orientation,
which complemented and thus diminished ‘old’ ideas of historical ‘truth’.
Polish-Lithuanian harmony causes troubles with Belarus: The Licvin-theory of
Ermalovič and the reaction of Gudavičius
The ‘losers’ in this Polish-Lithuanian agreement are the Belarusians. For them, the
common past with their neighbours turned out to be a malediction rather than a
chance. A similar partition of historical heritage to that between Poland and Lithuania
is not possible, because there was never either a historical ‘Lithuanian’ or a
‘Belarusian’ unit, dividing the Grand Duchy in two parts
53 which could have been
used as Lithuanian and Belarusian by predecessor states. This means that the
development of two exclusive, but harmonised narratives was not possible either.
So harmonising the narratives between Poland and Lithuania automatically means
excluding Belarus – a problem all Belarusian national narratives have to cope with.
50 See e.g. Bronys Savukynas, ‘Su kaimynais kaimyniškai, arba pokalbiai apie senuosius stereotipus’,
Kultūros barai, 8, 9, 1997: 2. Saulius Drazdauskas speaks even of the ‘end of history’ of both
countries. Saulius Drazdauskas, ‘Lenkų sindromo pabaiga? Kelios pastabos su istoriniu kontekstu’,
Naujasis Židinys – Aidai, 10, 2001: 521-24, (521).
51 In his analysis of the Polish political system, Zdzisław Krasnodębski describes the unwillingness of
Polish liberals to deal with the past at all: Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Demokracja peryferii, Gdańsk 2003:
229-39. The strategy of getting rid of history may be a consequence of this attitude towards the past.
52 Saulius Kubrys, National Minorities in Lithuania. An Outline, trans. by Milda Dyke, Vilnius 2002.
For an official point of view see Tautinių mažumų ir išeivijos departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos
Vyriausybės (ed.), Tautinių mažumų švietimas Lietuvoje: teoriniai ir praktiniai aspektai. Konferencijos
medžiaga 2000 m. gruodžio mėn. 19 – 20. d., Vilnius 2001.
53 A somewhat similar situation exists between Poles and Ukrainians. The Grand Duchy contained
before 1569 important parts of regions with Ukrainian settlers. These regions went after the Lublin
Union to Korona Polska. So there is a historical border separating present-day Belarus and Ukraine, but
not Ukraine and Poland. But this is of no further importance for today, because Korona Polska and the
Grand Duchy do not play a central role as they do in Ukrainian foundation myths.76
Bearing in mind the fact that present-day Belarus and Lithuania both contain parts of
the mentioned intersection area, but not of present-day Poland, it becomes obvious
that there appeared disputes especially between Belarus and Lithuania over history
and not so much between Belarus and Poland. In Belarus there exists at least one
strong narrative, which describes Belarus as a successor to the Grand Duchy. This
posed a particular problem to Lithuanians, who rejected this part of the Belarusian
conception as a whole.
These problems occurred very early when a new historiography was coming into
being, seeking for alternative terms beyond the Soviet paradigm. In 1989, Mikola
Ermalovich published his ideas on Belarusian origin,
54 which later on he worked out
in detail. According to him, the historical right on the designation ‘Lithuania’ does not
belong to Lithuanians, but to Belarusians. His argumentation works as follows:
In the same way that there existed under the Baltic term of “Prusiia” a
strong German state, there hid under the Baltic term of “Litva” a strong
East-Slav state. In the same way that the Eastern Germans were called
“Prusaki”, who should not be confused with Prussians [“Prusy”], so
Belarusians of the Nemen area [paniamonskia belarusy] were called
‘litviny’, who should not be confused with “litoŭcy”. The Grand Duchy of
Lithuania was a poly-ethnical state, but judging by the history of its
foundation on the territory of Belarus, which was its nucleus, and by the
domination of Belarusian culture and language it was first of all a
Belarusian state.
55
Without further research it is not possible to discuss these statements, but that is not
the task of the present article. Ermalovich’s statements form an important part of the
Belarusian way of coping with the past. Even if Ermalovich holds an extreme
position, which is not shared by all Belarusian colleagues,
56 his ideas were highly
important for a certain direction in the discourse on Belarusian self-awareness.
Historians tried to postulate an ethnic-based regional conscience of the Polish-
speaking intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, calling them licviny, and occupying
the regional conscience of Polish speaking noblemen of eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries for this purposes. Great figures such as Adam Mickiewicz are placed in the
proximity of Belarusian culture, implicitly acquiring a certain degree of
Belarusianness.
57
But the ideas of Ermalovich represent not so much an opposition to Polish, but rather
to the Lithuanian narrative, indirectly denying Lithuanians the right to their very
name. Several political circles even propagated the idea of renaming the Republic
Belarus as ‘Litvania’.
58 This triggered, as a consequence, sharp reactions on the part
of Lithuanian historians. When in 1993 a reader of Belarusian history directed to a
54 Mikola Ermalovich, Pa shliadach adnago mifa, Minsk 1989.
55 Mikola Ermalovich, Starazhytnaia Belarus’. Polacki i novagarodski peryiady, Minsk 1990: 351.
56 See a moderate position in Henadz’ Sahanovich, Narys historyi Belarusi, Minsk 2001:59-94. Zejmis,
‘Belarusian National Historiography’, 392-94 describes the ‘more measured approach’ of the majority
of Belarusian historians.
57 On the Polish life of Minsk in the first half of 19
th century see Tadeusz Zienkiewicz, Polskie życie
literackie w Mińsku w XIX i na początku XX wieku do roku 1921, Olsztyn 1997. For a Belarusian
interpretation of Mickiewicz see Lew Miračycki, ‘Adam Mickewicz im Bewusstsein der
Beloruthenen’, in Zdzisław Krasnodębski and Stefan Garsztecki (ed.), Sendung und Dichtung. Adam
Mickiewicz in Europa, Hamburg 2002: 293-300.
58 See the website of this group: <http://www.come.to.litvania.html> [Accessed 9 February 2004].77
broader public was published, Lithuanians reacted and rejected the main ideas.
59 The
debate reached its peak with an article by the Lithuanian historian Edvardas
Gudavičius, who not only rejected this idea as a whole, but also questioned the
scientific character of his colleagues’ contributions.
60 Alfredas Bumblauskas from
Vilnius University spoke of the ‘infantile diseases of a nascent Belarusian
nationalism’.
61
This is an excellent demonstration of the great importance of foundation myths in the
formation of collective identities. The Belarusian attempt to usurp a common
foundation myth, exclusively for one’s own purposes, violated the needs of the
Lithuanian construction of collective identity. For Lithuanians it is simply impossible
to accept the thesis of a leading and founding role played by the Belarusians instead of
the Lithuanians at the beginning of the Grand Duchy, because it stands in sharp
contrast to a Lithuanian historical narrative, which imparts legitimation to modern
Lithuania and as such forms an integral part of the raison d’été of the present-day
Lithuanian state. This is moreover a narrative that has now been accepted by Polish
historians and thereby once more confirmed in Lithuanian consciousness.
Nevertheless, Lithuanian historians were, on the whole, open to sharing the heritage
of the Grand Duchy with Belarusians, but proposed a totally different version of
Belarusian ethnogenesis.
62 This remained so after the ‘agreement’ on history with
Polish historians.
Choosing another past?
In 1995 Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka introduced a new state flag and
coat of arms. The Pahonia motive was rejected and replaced by a composition with
visible similarities to the former Soviet coat of arms including such elements as the
Red Star and wheat ears. This was not only a change of symbols, but the introduction
of a second historical narrative on Belarusian history, conceptualising Belarus rather
as part of the East-Slavonic family than a Western-orientated country. This meant a
reorientation towards Soviet Belarusian traditions, as Lukashenka himself stressed.
63
Additionally, it marked a radical change in the formation of official identity: if with
the Pahonia motive Belarusian identity was intended to use the whole past of the
intersection area for its own purposes, now a sharp rupture was being made by
59 I. Saverchanka and Zm. San’ko, 100 pytanniaŭ i adkazaŭ z historyi Belarusi, Minsk 1993. In 1994 a
translation of several passages was printed in Naujasis Židinys, followed by a comment by Kastytis
Stalioraitis, ‘DLK paveldas ir Baltarusiai’, Naujasis Židinys, 9,10, 1994: 52-9.
60 Edvardas Gudavičius, ‘Following the tracks of a myth’, Lithuanian Historical Studies, 1, 1996: 38-
58.
61 Alfredas Bumblauskas, ‘The heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: perspectives of historical
consciousness’, in Grigorijus Potashenko ed. The peoples of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Vilnius,
2002: 28.
62 In Lithuania, the ideas of Edvardas Gudavičius on Belarusian ethnogenesis are widely accepted. He
speaks of a proto-Belarusian ethnic group called Gudai, from which originated both the Belarusians
and the Ukrainians: Edvardas Gudavičius, ‘The Ruthenians’, in Potašenko, The peoples, 45-56 (earlier
published in Lithuanian in Vytautas Ališauskas et al. ed. Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštijos Kultūra.
Tyrinėjimai ir vaizdai, Vilnius 2001: 197-206.
63 Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus’ A. G. Lukashenko na vstreche s pobeditieliami i
prizerami konkursa na luchshii poiasnitel’nyi tekst k Gosudarstvennomu gerbu Respubliki Belarus’ i
Gosudarstvennomu flagu Respubliki Belarus’ 25 sentiabria 1996, in Skobelev, Gerb i flag, 5. See also
Astrid Sahm, ‘Political Culture and National Symbols: Their Impact on the Belarusian Nation-building
Process’, Nationalities Papers 27 1999: 649-61 and Rüdiger Ritter, ‘Ein Wappen, zwei Staaten. Der
Reiter in Litauen und Belarus’, Osteuropa, 54, 7, 2004: 37-51.78
stressing Soviet foundation myths and putting a stop to using the whole intersected
past as a primary source of identity.
But this proved unfeasible. The court historians around Lukashenka tried to ban
Pahonia as a ‘fascistic’ symbol, but failed in excluding it totally from their narrative.
64
They failed also in dominating Belarusian society with their narrative and symbols:
The main propagator of the idea of Pahonia as a state symbol had been the Belarusian
People’s Front ‘Adradzhennje’, the most important political factor in the early ‘90s.
This organisation lost considerable political influence after 1995, but nevertheless it
was possible to organise a conference in 2002 by members of the People’s Front
‘Adradzhennje’ on ‘Ideals of the Belarusian National Republic and the Rebirth of
Belarus’.
65 In 2003, in Belarusian bookshops a huge coloured volume on Belarusian
history was sold which had been printed in Slovakia and presenting an opposite
version of Belarusian history, stressing the officially condemned foundation myths.
66
This demonstrates once more that it is not sufficient simply to ban intersected
historical facts, because the narrative thus constructed seems artificial, violates
historical memory and cannot prevail over other existing concepts. The dispute is
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